2. Nation-building and national narratives

2.1. The French Revolution and the creation of the nation-state

On June 17, 1789, the "Third Estate" of the French Estates General, now meeting as "the Communes" declared itself as the Assemblée nationale. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, adopted on August 26, 1789, thus, logically, begins with the following words: "Les représentants du peuple français, constitués en ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE, considérants que...." In his famed pamphlet of 1789, "Qu'est-ce que le Tiers Etat?" the Abbé Sieyès had laid the theoretical groundwork for this move: "Le Tiers embrasse donc tout ce qui appartient à la nation; et tout ce qui n'est pas le Tiers ne peut se regarder comme étant de la nation." In the midst of the crisis of the ancient régime the French middle classes had created the Nation française on the basis of popular sovereignty. There are numerous national narratives that build on this act of creation: the Storming of the Bastille, on July 14,1789, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, the adoption of the Constitution, the introduction of universal (male) suffrage, the execution of Louis XVI, the creation of the French Revolutionary Army, based on universal conscription, the installment of the Revolutionary Calendar and the Cult of Reason, later supplanted by Cult of the Supreme Being. The internal foes of the Revolution, nobility and clergy, were delegitimized by disputing their membership in la Nation. With the Revolution being carried to all of the countries of Europe, the European monarchies came to be seen not only as enemies of the Revolution but at the same time as enemies of the Nation. National narratives - stories of the execution, by guillotine, of nobles and clergy, later even of partisans of the Revolution, of the cockade and the Phrygian cap, of the Marseillaise and the Cannonade of Valmy. These revolutionary-era national narratives survived the Revolution and the First Republic and have continued, through two Empires and two further republics and down to today's Fifth Republic, to bolster the legitimacy and stability of each of these political systems. And today no one in the country doubts in the least that France is the "Grande Nation" per se.

This is the reason why the Revolution plays a central role in the curriculum of French schools, as different as the interpretations of the Revolution advanced by different theoretical camps have been, and these differences have been and are reflected in French schoolbooks.¹ Indeed, we may even say that there are virtually as many views on the topic as there are schoolbook authors.² One thing we cannot say, though, is that the French Revolution is over, for it continues today in scholarship and in schoolbooks.³But it is not only French schoolbooks that are shaped by the Revolution. The volume presented by Rainer Riemenschneider, and cited above - "Images of a Revolution - The French revolution in History School Textbooks throughout the World" - shows that it plays a central role in schoolbooks just about everywhere in the world. Why is that? In their summary to the publication just cited, Alice Gerard and Rainer Riemenschneider answer the question as follows: "On constate que la Révolution française a rempli et continue a remplir une fonction de légitimation du régime en place,"⁴ a conclusion wholly consistent with the thesis of this introduction.

2.2. Foundation of the German Empire: Germany, the "latecomer nation"

In the winter of 1807/1808 - in the wake of the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, the abdication of the Emperor, Napoleons victory over Prussia and the French occupation of the country, the loss of its western provinces, and the humiliating Peace of Tilsit - the German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte, in his "Addresses to the German Nation," called for the creation of a German nation-state comprised of all countries whose language and culture made them German. What, in Fichte's eyes, was needed to create this state was a "German national education" that would serve more or less as a surrogate for the French-style revolution that had failed to materialize in Germany. Unlike the situation in France, where national narratives served to legitimize the successful revolution and stabilize the political system, German national narratives reflected a longing for a German nation-state. Here we need think only of Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, "Turnvater Jahn" a nationalist gymnastics educator who in 1813 called for creation of a German nation-state, or of the Barbarossa legend, according to which, at least in the words of a song current in 1819, Emperor Frederick I (1122-1190) was to return and restore the glory of the Empire, or of the Deutschlandlied ("Deutschland, Deutschland über alles"), which was written in 1841 on the Island of Helgoland, at that time a British possession, and names four rivers as Germany's borders - not one of which ever flowed in Germany. But it was not a German national education that led to the foundation of the German Empire, it took several wars, including the Franco-German, or Franco-Prussian, War of 1870/71 to get the job done. This is the reason why German national narratives build on this war. As the story goes, Bismarck provoked the war, against the will of the King of Prussia, by tampering with a diplomatic dispatch (the so-called Ems Dispatch); another popular narrative is that the only reason why Bavaria, the land of Ludwig II ("the Fairytale King"), joined the fight was that Bismarck had "bought" the Bavarian king - by offering him sizable subsidies. The "Iron Chancellor," as Bismarck later came to be known, is also claimed to have shielded Germany, through his wily treaty policy, from the two-front war that Kaiser Wilhelm II, driven by his aspirations for power and his craving for admiration, precipitated virtually on his own, and, le gend would have us believe, the reason why this German Empire lost the First World War was not a military defeat but a "stab in the back," that is, on account of the way in which the Empire was delegitimized by the socialists and pacifists active on the home front (what is known as the Dolchstosslegende).

The national education that Fichte called for in 1811 was not implemented in the German school system, it remained an unfulfilled demand. The German Volkschule, an elementary school, was concerned with teaching practical skills and Christian truths and values, while the Gymnasium was reserved for higher, classical, education. In view of the political conditions in the country, instruction in contemporary history was virtually taboo, and Jahn-style "political-revolutionary" gymnastics instruction was banned altogether.⁸ The situation was to change only after the German Empire had been founded. In school history courses, the medieval Empire now figured as the First Empire, and the "Legends of the Middle Ages," including e.g. the Barbarossa legend, found their way into German schoolbooks. The foundation of the second Empire was derived from Prussian history, with schoolbooks taking mainly a dynastic approach to German history. However, opinions tend to diverge on the issue of whether German schoolbooks glorified the war leading to the foundation of the Empire, with the aim of educating students in the sprit of militarism. While it is true that statements made by politicians and military leaders seem to indicate an educational aim of this kind, and the critical literature on the issue tends to assume this was the case, German teachers were far more likely to have a liberal outlook, and in reality German schooling is more likely to have reflected a critical stance toward the war - a fact, though, that did little to change the generally patriotic, dynastic, and religious orientation of German schooling and schoolbooks.⁵ Even after the Empire had collapsed, i.e. in the Weimar Republic, these national myths and legends continued to lead a life of their own in Germany's school system. National Socialism claimed to have founded a "Third Empire," or "Reich," and sought, in its educational policies, to build on the unbroken history of the German nation.

2.3. The breakthrough of the right of self-determination for all

peoples in the peace treaties concluded in the wake of the First World War.

In the course of the 19th century, the principle of the nation-state - predicated on the idea that every people should have a state of its own - prevailed throughout Europe, finally reaching even the latecomers, Germany and Italy. But there were still peoples that had not yet been liberated, in particular in the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, both of them multi-ethnic in composition. As Woodrow Wilson stated on January 8, 1918, in his Fourteen Points Address to the US Congress:

What we demand in this war (...) is that the world he made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it he made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression.

It was on this basis that the peace treaties led not only to a significant redrawing of borders but also to the (re)emergence of a multiplicity of new states: Finland and the three Baltic countries, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia, Syria, Iraq and the North African states, and, not least, Austria, the core territory of the Habsburg Empire, and Turkey, the core land of the Ottoman Empire. Even though the principle of national self-determination was not implemented consistently, a circumstance that led to a good number of conflicts in the first half of the 20th century, we can say that the peace treaties concluded in the wake of the First World War did contribute to a later breakthrough, in Europe and the Middle East, of the idea of the nation-state based on the principle of self-determination. For many ethnic minorities, however, this triumph of the idea of the nation-state turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory in those cases where they were prevented from seeking union with a state of their choosing, as e.g. in the case of Austria and Germany, or when they were not permitted to found states of their own, as e.g. in the case of Armenia.

This latter case in particular led to conflicts that are still with us today. As early as in the late 19th century conflicts had arisen between Turks, Armenians, and Kurds in the Ottoman Empire, and it came repeatedly to massacres, attacks, and assassinations. But it was only in 1914, when the so-called Young Turks took power for a second time, setting up a military dictatorship, that these conflicts escalated to the point where they, in 1915, culminated in a genocide against the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. With the Ottoman Empire having sided with Germany in the war, and it becoming increasingly clear that the Empire was ultimately faced with dissolution, the Young Turk government sought to secure Anatolia as the core territory of a new Turkish nation-state, first by eliminating the Armenians and later by expelling the Greek population from Anatolia. Kemal Attatürk, who put an end to the rule of the Young Turks in the Ottoman Empire and founded the new state of Turkey, came more and more to build on the national aspirations of the Young Turks - a development reflected, among other things, in the failure of the Turkish National Assembly to ratify the Treaty of Sèvres, in the failure of the war crime trials imposed by the Entente Powers against the leaders of the Young Turks to produce results, and in the new regime's attempts to justify the Armenian genocide as a condition necessary to legitimize and stabilize the new Turkish state. The Armenian genocide and the expulsion of the Greek population from western Turkey had become the sine qua non of the Turkish state.

Despite the overwhelming evidence presented by foreign governments, the Turkish government and military constructed national narratives assigning to the Armenians the blame for their own expulsion. It is not surprising that Turkish historiography contributed in key ways to underpinning this thesis and that Turkish schoolbooks from this period had nothing to say about the genocide. In her paper, Jennifer Dixon explains that this continued to be the case between 1950 and 1980, while something changed in the years after 1980 - a matter to which we will return.

2.4. The creation of spurious nation-states in connection with decolonization

It may appear that the withdrawal of the Western colonial powers from Asia led to the creation of ethnically homogeneous nation-states. That, however, was not the case. China and India - to name only the two largest countries concerned - were and continue to be multi-ethnic states in which political and/or religious -but not ethnic - grounds served to constitute the state. This was especially the case in Africa. The new "nation-states" that emerged in the wake of the withdrawal of the colonial powers found themselves with borders drawn - often arbitrarily - by these very same colonial powers.

There is, at least in Subsaharan Africa, not one single state grounded on the country's ethnic unity. Quite on the contrary, the population of most of these states consists either of a multiplicity of ethnic groups or is dominated by two or three dominant, and rival, ethnic groups. This goes e.g. for Sudan, Rwanda-Burundi, the Congo, and Nigeria.

When Nigeria, then a British colony, declared its independence, the country was populated - alongside a multiplicity of smaller ethnic groups - by three large and powerful peoples, the Hausa, the Yoruba, the Igbo - which differed completely in historical, political and social terms. Prior to independence, the British colonial administration had sought, unsuccessfully, to give these peoples a federal constitution. Nevertheless, the yearning for liberty, coupled with expectations of major economic successes, widespread in Nigeria when the country declared its independence, superseded the aspirations widely held in the period that independence should lead to the creation of a set of separate nation-states.⁶ The outcome was a situation in which these three people have, until today, continued to vie for power. Following a period of centralist rule by the Igbo, a Hausa-led regime came to power, a development that led to the secession of Biafra as an independent Igbo state. In 1970, following nearly four years of bloody fighting, Biafra was finally subdued.

All three of these peoples have national narratives of their own. Before being subdued, in the 18th century, by the Fulbe, who intermingled with them, the Hausa had founded seven states, all of them aristocracies, in the 5th to 7th centuries, adopting Islam in the 11th century. The Hausa are fond of invoking a myth of their own origins, with a hero, coming from the east, using a knife he himself forged to slay, and deliver the people from, an evil serpent, after which he married the queen, assuming a power legitimated by his deeds. The Yoruba, who hold themselves to be the world's most ancient people, are, in actual fact, not a people at all and never had a state of their own. They are fond of invoking a ruler who was cut by a slave into hundreds of pieces that, cast to the four winds, were later gathered up in a calabash. From this the Yoruba construct a myth of integration. The Igbo, finally, a people that in former times lived in egalitarian village communities,⁷ believed in a celestial creator-god and a fertility goddess, who together form the basis of a strong cult of ancestor worship, as vividly depicted by Chinua Achebe in his 1958 novel "Things Fall Apart."

These religious-national myths serve to construct three completely different national narratives - and three completely different educational systems, for today the Hausa north is strictly Islamic and the Yoruba and Igbo south, having, at least on the surface, overcome its animist traditions, is now largely Christian, an open field for mass sects like the Pentecostal movement. There has never been, and probably will never be, any successful attempt to use national narratives as the vehicle for a common Nigerian identity that could serve as a basis for creating national stability - even though Nigerian school-books do seek to construct a federalist national history of this kind.⁸ These efforts, though, find themselves faced with active separatist traditions in each of the country's three major regions, including in particular efforts in Igboland to glorify the lost Biafra war, especially on the part of the so-called MASSOB movement, which champions segregationist tendencies. Just as national narratives serve to justify the legitimacy and stability of political systems in other countries, the example of Nigeria shows what can happen in the absence of such national narratives, and it must therefore be seen as a confirmation, albeit a negative one, of our thesis on the significant role played by national narratives for the legitimacy and stability of political systems.

2.5. Political systems and national narratives in today's world

Unable to look into the national narratives of all the countries in the world, the conference referred to above was forced to choose and to focus on a sample. The papers held were selected on the basis of an international essay competition on the Internet (www.Irmgard-Coninx-Foundation.de); that is to say, the selection made was shaped by the submissions received, with some additional papers added. Still, the sample was of course shaped by the somewhat random nature of the submissions received, and is itself therefore not free of a certain randomness. Still, we are convinced that the papers selected provide a reasonable look at the issue of national narratives in today's world.

2.5.1. State-building

Even today young states continue to need and to make use of national narratives as a basis of their state-building efforts and to consolidate political rule. The Republic of Yemen was created, in 1990, from the Yemen Arab Republic in the north and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen in the south, two states that were virtually polar opposites. Today Yemen invokes a set of entirely different national narratives. Some deal with times of yore, when the Queen of Sheba ruled the ancient kingdom of Yemen. Having learned of the fame and wealth of King Solomon, she took upon herself a long, arduous journey to pay him homage. Others are concerned with specters of the more immediate past, feudalist Saudi forces in the north and the British colonial power in the south, both of which are subdued by the Yemeni nation. Just how necessary these national narratives are in political terms is illustrated quite aptly by the current struggles in Yemen against Shiite segregationist insurgents in the north and secessionists insurgents in the south, forces with a segregationist agenda of their own who are reported to support al Qaida terrorists. In her paper, Young (see chapter 1, below) shows how these conflicts are reflected in Yemini schoolbooks. Cyprus, which has yet to acquire integrated statehood, consists of the Republic of Cyprus in the south, a member of the EU, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which lacks international recognition. Efforts have been underway since 2003 to reunite the two Cypruses. In 1960 Cyprus was released from British administration and constituted as an independent unitary state. But the island has been partitioned since a Greek military coup staged in 1974 with the aim of annexing Cyprus' Greek south, followed by a Turkish military occupation of the Turkish north. Turkey regards the north as an integral part of Anatolia, and until very recently Turkish national narratives tended to emphasize Cyprus's history as part of the Ottoman Empire, whose legitimate successor Turkey claims to be. For some time now, though, a wind of change has been blowing over Cyprus, and not only because the border between north and south has become more permeable but also because the national narratives in northern Cyprus are changing, as Latif shows in her analysis of the schoolbooks in use there (see chapter 2, below). The question is whether the constitution of a northern Cypriote identity is to serve the end of legitimizing a separate Cypriote state in the north or of paving the way for a reunification of the two Cypruses.

2.5.2. State reconstruction after a lost war

When states lose wars, for the most part they do not lose statehood. They simply have to pay for the consequences of the lost war, reparations and reconstruction, as e.g. in the case of the German Empire after the First World War. However, things had changed when the Second World War drew to a close. Germany and Japan were occupied. Germany was stripped of its sovereign powers as a state and divided up into zones of occupation in which the victorious powers exercised sovereignty. In Germany it was long a matter of controversy whether the German Empire had come to an end or continued to exist under the occupation. Japan, on the other hand, retained its sovereignty, despite occupation. While the Emperor did renounce his divinity, he still remained Japans head of state. Japan was given a new constitution as early as in 1946, while the two Germanys that emerged from the war were given their constitutions only in 1949, after the German Länder had adopted theirs. For both countries, though, the loss of the war and the new beginning under foreign occupation was in fact tantamount to a restoration of statehood. On what national traditions, what national narratives did they base their efforts?

The west German Federal Republic built on the legacy of the Weimer Republic and the German democratic revolutions of 1848 and 1918, while in the east the German Democratic Republic laid more emphasis on the traditions of socialism and the republics of soldiers' and workers' councils that emerged in the wake of the First World War. The German Democratic Republic was very soon to be integrated into the Socialist International, while the integration of the Federal Republic into the West took somewhat longer, and was at first a matter of some contention. The Federal Republic assumed the legal succession to the German Empire and was hard put to accept its obligation to pay its war debt and to accept responsibility for the crimes perpetrated by National Socialism. The German Democratic Republic, on the other hand, defining itself as the first socialist state on German soil, rejected any and all responsibility for the past. As one step on the way to gaining readmission to the community of civilized nations, the Federal Republic paid reparations to the Jewish people and developed a close relationship to the newly founded state of Israel. Above all, though, the Federal Republic sought to establish good neighborly relations with France and Poland, building on positive traditions. Carlowitz deals with this issue in his analysis of school curriculum and schoolbooks (see chapter 3, below).

In Japan the break with the past was nowhere near as radical as it was in Germany, and Japan was spared partition. While it is true that Japan was forced to withdraw from all the territories it had occupied, and its political and military leadership was tried by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Japan was far more able than Germany to build on its national traditions. This is the reason why Japan was far more reluctant than Germany to acknowledge its war crimes and accept its need to make amends for them. In his paper, Saaler describes the evolution of post-war Japanese national narratives and they way they are reflected in the Japanese educational system (see chapter 4, below).

2.5.3. Regime change

If, instead of collapsing and/or being reestablished, a states political regime is changed, e.g. through revolution or war, it will find itself faced with an especially great need for legitimation and stabilization. What is at issue here is, in other words, not a change of government of the kind usual in democratic states but system - regime - change. To what extent will the new rulers, then, be able to invoke and build on existing national traditions, and to what extent will they be forced to create and justify new traditions? In situations of this kind, dealing with memories is often a tightrope walk between identification with a country's history and the need to make new start. The French and Russian revolutions each broke completely with their respective ancien regimes; but the new rulers, and, later, Napoleon and Stalin in particular, built in many respects on the power politics in which their predecessors had indulged, and in doing so they made liberal use of national narratives extending far back into the past. The Soviet Union's victory in the Second World War and its capture and occupation of many countries in eastern Central Europe led, sooner or later, to regime change in all of the occupied countries; that is to say, the Soviet Union took steps to ensure that communist governments were installed in these countries and that these new regimes were allied with it, in the Socialist International politically and in the Warsaw Pact in military and economic terms. Yet all of these countries sought to build on their own pre-socialist traditions, for each and every one of them - we need think here only of Poland or Hungary - had a long and complex national past. And when major troubles emerged, it was quite often because this national past had been marked by conflicts with Russia or because the country concerned was home to a Russian minority, as in the case of the Baltic countries. In his paper, Misco looks into the ways in which Latvia has dealt with these problems (see chapter 5, below).

Decolonization was the source of the second major wave of regime change in the postwar era. In the 1960s colonial rule came to an end nearly everywhere, with new, independent states emerging in the process. South Africa, however, was a special case. While it is true that South Africa was under British colonial rule, the Boer republics were ruled by so-called Boers, who had immigrated from Holland, and these republics were independent, for which reason the Netherlands did not figure there as a colonial power. In other words, here regime change meant not independence from a European colonial power and creation of a new state but termination of the rule of one population group, the Boers, and creation of a multi ethnic state. This transformation from an apartheid regime to a pluralist democratic state proved to be a particularly difficult process, and this is the reason why it took many years and a protracted, brutal struggle to complete, in 1994.

Since it continued into the relatively recent past, the memory of apartheid it is still present in the minds of all South Africans. While it has been overcome in legal terms - today all South Africans are equal - it refuses to go away in mental and social terms, and it continues to divide the white and black population. This is the reason why, in today's South Africa, memory politics means above all remembering the era of apartheid and the process of overcoming it. In her paper, Weldon explains in particular how this is addressed in teacher training programs (see chapter 6, below).

2.5.4. Stability of political systems

Political systems, including the multiparty systems of the Western democracies, are always faced with the threat of instability. They are threatened within when they are forced, as they constantly are, to find a balance between varying interests; externally they were faced with threats from the socialist countries and today they are faced with the threat of international terrorism. It is for this reason interesting to observe how the Western democracies - in the broadest sense of the term - deal with their internal and external foes, whether and how they utilize national narratives in their attempts to address threats of these kinds.

In the 1950s Turkey - as we have seen above (see No. 1.3, above) - steadfastly denied the Armenian genocide, and Turkish schoolbooks had nothing to say about the issue. In her paper, Dixon goes on to describe the 1980s and 1990s in Turkey, when schoolbooks, while making mention of the genocide, ultimately attributed it to the war policies of the Entente and the behavior of the Armenian population (see chapter 7, below). These were years that saw shifts in Turkeys party-political power structure, with Turkey applying for accession to the EU and insisting since then that its application be given due consideration. It is probably safe to say that the national narratives bound up with the issue of the genocide, and the treatment accorded to it in Turkish schoolbooks, need to be viewed in the context of these developments in domestic and foreign policy.

In western Europe the 1960s and 1970s saw the emergence - often in connection with the so-called student movement - of a number of neo-Marxist groups; and these in turn were the seedbeds for a number of leftist terrorist movements that used assassination and violent attacks as instruments to undercut the stability of the political systems they had targeted. The most important of these groups were the Red Army Faction (RAF) in West Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy. While the Western democracies were ill prepared for these attacks, ultimately they did take measures to defend themselves, sometimes even going so far as to endanger the liberal principles on which they are based. In other words, the stability of the political system was faced with a twofold risk, namely terrorism at home, on the one hand, which, it was insinuated, enjoyed support from abroad, and an associated tendency toward de-liberalization, which constituted a threat to the foundations on which the political system rested. T'To make matters worse, in some countries the system was attacked not only by the extreme political left, but by right-wing terrorist organizations as well, as Hajek demonstrates in her analysis of Italian schoolbooks ( see chapter 8, below). In any case schoolbooks have had the function of contributing to stabilizing political systems that have at times proven to be quite unstable.

While leftist terrorist groups no longer represent a threat to the western European democracies, guerilla organizations continue to operate in many countries of the world, attacking the Western-oriented political systems of their home countries, in particular for the their alleged political dependence on and complicity with US "imperialism," and seeking to establish people's democracy-style regimes in their own countries. The best-known examples are FARC in Columbia and Shining Path in Peru. In her paper,

Paulson notes that the Peruvian government has set up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to assess and deal with the history of the Shining Path movement (see chapter 9, below). The author goes on to look into the ways in which Peruvian school-books deal with Shining Path. The author argues that the ways in which schoolbooks present the matter has played a major role in the public debate in Peru, and done so precisely because these presentations have made use of reports issued by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. It is quite interesting to note that the stability and legitimation of political systems in South America appears to be jeopardized by the ways in which guerilla conflicts are presented in a given country, even if these presentations are based on reports issued by neutral commissions.

1 Riemenschneider, R. (ed.) (1994), Bilder einer Revolution, Images d'une Révolution, Images of a Revolution, Diesterweg, Frankfurt.

2 Fulconis, M. and M. (1989), La Révolution Française dans les Manuels Scolaires: Mensonge ou Vérité? Editions Serre, Nice, p. 189.

3 Hinrichs, E. (1994), Ist die französische Revolution beendet? Eine Bestandsaufnahme, in: Riemenschneider, R. (ed.), Bilder einer Revolution, Diesterweg, Frankfurt, pp. 683-698.

Jäger, G. and Tenorth, E. (1987), Pädagogisches Denken, in: Jeismann, K.E. and Lundgreen, P. (eds.), Handbuch der deutschen Bildungsgeschichte, Vol III, Beck, Munich, p. 166.

4 Op. cit., p.700.

5 At least according to Kelly, A. (1993), The Franco-Prussian War and Unification in German History Schoolbooks, in: Pape, W. (ed.), 1870/71 - 1989/90 - German Unifications and the Change of Literary Discourse, De Gruyter, Berlin-New York, pp. 37-60.

6 Meredith, M. (2006), The State of Africa, Simon and Schuster, London, p. 75.

7 Harneit-Sievers, A. (2006), Constructions of Belonging - Igbo Communities and the Nigerian State in the Twentieth Century, University of Rochester Press, Rochester.

8 Eluwa, G.J. et al. (1989), A History of Nigeria for Schools and Colleges, Africana-Feb, Onitsha; Duze, U. (1985), 100 Model Questions and Answers on National History of Nigeria, Evans Brothers, Ibadan, p. 198.