Sven Saaler

Abstract

This article explores the political and social background of the ongoing history textbook controversy in Japan. As a consequence of the strong connection between conservative historical revisionism, which has initiated renewed debates about history education and historical memory since the late 1990s, and the conservative establishment in Japanese politics, the view of Japan's recent history presented in memorials, museums and ceremonies, or in other words in that part of the public sphere concerned with the culture and politics of memory, increasingly reflects that advocated by historical revisionists. This is a view that depicts the Asian-Pacific War (1931-1945) as a defensive war waged against the West, or as a war waged for the 'liberation" of Asia. This position amounts to an apologetic legitimisation of Japan's wartime past. However, it does not reflect societal consensus in Japan: opinion surveys indicate instead that revisionist views face an uphill battle, and remain, at least at present, minority views. This also explains why the revisionist textbook published by the Association for the Creation of New Textbooks (Atarashii Rekishi Kydkasho o Tsukuru-kai, commonly known as Tsukuru-kai) has been selected for use in classrooms by no more than a tiny minority of junior high schools in Japan.

"Rien"

Entry in Louis XVI's diary for 14 July 1789, the day the Bastille was stormed

Introduction

Historical events often appear in a different light to later generations than to those who live through them. When Louis XVI wrote "Nothing" as his diary entry on 14 July 1789, was he merely displaying ignorance, or could we conclude that the storming of the Bastille was not accorded much significance in the context of other events at the time? The notion popularised by French historians in the meantime, that this event

marked a watershed in world history, dates only from the late nineteenth century -and an examination of the historical record shows that the "storming of the Bastille" did not actually take place in the manner we imagine it today. The event was also undoubtedly little remarked upon by the king and others then in power who probably saw it as little more than a minor disturbance.

Nevertheless, the symbolic significance of the storming, and the historical memory of the event, can hardly be underestimated, either with respect to French national historiography or to the current French sense of identity. That significance is independent of the factual content or the reality of the event itself. The paths of history and memory tend to diverge, when the ways how people choose to recall events become strongly influenced by politics or a drive to establish a particular national narrative. Although history and memory are often considered as being identical, it has become quite clear since Pierre Noras work that we have to differentiate between the two.

Memory and history, far from being synonymous, appear now to be in fundamental opposition. Memory [...] remains [...] vulnerable to manipulation and appropriation [...]. History, because it is an intellectual and secular production, calls for analysis and criticism. Memory installs remembrance within the sacred; history, always prosaic, releases it again. Memory is blind to all but the group it binds [...]. History, on the other hand, belongs to everyone and to no one, whence its claim to universal authority. (Nora 1989: 8f) Although the French Revolution lies already more than two centuries in the past, historians and other scholars continue to debate not only the historical significance of this event, but also — and with growing intensity — the role of the Revolution in French memory and French collective identity. The German historian Reinhard Koselleck has argued that increasing temporal distance from a historical event goes hand-in-hand with increased factuality in the debates about it, as well as a historicization of the event itself. But, as Aleida Assmann (1999: 14) points out, this is not true of all historical events. The debates about recent German history, for example, have become more intense - and more passionate - with the passage of time, particularly those about the National Socialist era. Pierre Nora has pointed out that this is a global phenomenon of recent decades and has spoken of a "world-wide upsurge in memory" and the coming of an "age of commemoration." (Nora 2002)

It is therefore not surprising that in Japan, too, discussions about the historical significance of its modern history, particularly that of the "Asia-Pacific War" (1931-45), about the question of how to memorize that war and the related question of how to commemorate the victims of that war are intensifying. One facet of these debates is the so-called history textbook controversy. For most of the postwar period, Japanese high school history textbooks have functioned much like a battlefield, on which fierce debates regarding the interpretation of Japans war legacies were fought. The conservative establishment, seeking to emphasize the continuity of Japanese history aimed at keeping critical views concerning Japan's war responsibility, especially any detailed information on Japanese war crimes, out of school textbooks. Not surprisingly, attempts on the part of the conservatives to sanitize the past, invariably triggered clashes with the strongly Marxist academic historians and predominantly leftist history teachers. The conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which governed Japan from 1955 to 2009 (with a short interruption in 1994/5), strongly favoured affirmative, "bright" views of Japan's national history in order to utilize the teaching of history and tradi

tion as tools by which to foster the legitimacy of Japans postwar political system and continuous LDP dominance. Since Japanese textbooks must go through an approval process administered by the Ministry of Education, until the 1980s critical views of the past were effectively kept out of classrooms. For this reason, the system of approval of history textbooks (kentei seido) has been strongly criticized by Japanese educators and historians as censorship. German sociologist Gesine Foljanty-Jost has characterized the ministry's textbook approval process as a tool aimed at stabilizing the political system (Foljanty-Jost 1979). However, the escalation of the textbook controversy into a major international issue in 1982 brought about changes in Japanese history textbooks. Since the 1990s, most Japanese history textbooks have included chapters on war responsibility and war crimes. Yet again in recent years, a counter-movement, critical of what its members denounce as a "masochistic view of Japanese history" (i.e., a critical view admitting responsibility for war and war atrocities) has powerfully emerged. It aims at instilling pride in the nation among Japanese youth through high school history education.

This article looks at how the culture of memory in the public sphere in Japan in recent years has come to be dominated by such a revisionist (or neo-nationalist) view of history. The advocates of this kind of historical revisionism (rekishi shuseishugi) have closely cooperated with the conservative establishment in politics, above all the long-dominant LDP. It can even be said that the historical revisionist "movement" was born and nurtured within the LDP. As I have shown elsewhere (Saaler 2005: ch. 1), the now well-known Association for the Creation of New Textbooks (Atarashii Rekishi Kyokasho o Tsukuru-kai, or in short Tsukuru-kai), which is at the centre of this movement consists in large part of members of a party committee founded within the LDP in the 1990s - the notorious History Examination Committee (Rekishi kento iinkai). The historical views the Tsukuru-kai has been promoting were set forth as early as 1995 in a publication by the LDP's History Examination Committee titled Summary of the Greater East Asia War (Daitd-A senso sdkatsu) (Rekishi Kento Iinkai 1995). These views have been receiving more and more attention ever since, because the Tsukuru-kai, provocatively depicts Japans modern wars as "defensive wars" or "wars of Asian liberation" (Ajia kaihd sensd) in which Japan takes on the role of victim - a victim, that is, of European and American imperialism.¹⁴⁸ The Tsukuru-kai narrative denies any kind of aggressive intent in wars waged by Japan. This obviously is a way to emphasize continuity in Japanese history and, thus, cater the desire of conservative circles to legitimize the contemporary political and social system as one that forms a continuous tradition dating back to the prewar system, premodern traditions and ultimately Japanese heritage. However, notwithstanding the media attention the Tsukuru-kai's provocative interpretations receive, such views apparently do not enjoy wide support in Japanese society. This might sound paradoxical, given the preponderance of such views in the culture of memory, i.e. in the public sphere. However, as the following pages demonstrate, Japan's historical revisionists are in the minority; their views do not reflect a societal consensus.

Politics and Memory

Again and again we read that "Japan" does not own up to its responsibility for the war or that it has not apologized to its Asian neighbours for the war and that Japan denies that the "Asia-Pacific War" (1931-45) was a war of aggression (Yamazaki 2005). Such blanket judgments, often repeated in the Western press (cf. AsiaSource 2003; Seaton 2007), call for clarification. First, however, one should try to explain how the impression has been created, particularly among foreign observers, that "Japan" denies any responsibility for the war or does not think Japanese wars have been aggressive. In this context "Japan" is usually confined to the world of politics. It is true that historical revisionist interpretations of Japans wartime past are widespread in the dominant, conservative political establishment, above all in the long-ruling government party, the LDP. The Democratic Party of Japan (DP J), which came to power in August 2009, effectively ending nearly 55 years of almost uninterrupted LDP-dominated governments, is seen as more accepting of critical views of history, but has yet to demonstrate policies different from the LDP regarding historical issues. Notorious "abusive statements" (bogen) made by LDP politicians questioning Japanese war responsibility or doubting that war crimes such as the Nanjing Massacre ever took place (cf. Waka-miya 1995) are often invoked as examples indicating the popularity of revisionist views within the conservative political establishment. However, we would do well to remember that the "Murayama Statement" of 1995 that speaks of a "mistaken national policy" as well as of Japanese aggression against Asian nations remains the official position of the Japanese government.¹⁴⁹ All cabinets since 1995 have confirmed the Murayama Statement as the Japanese governments official line. However, the continuing "abusive statements" by Japanese politicians¹⁵⁰ as well as state support for various memorial institutions (including commemoration sites, monuments, museums and memorial services) that contradict the Murayama Statement and therefore the official government line - or at least undermine this statement to a large degree. We can observe a marked preponderance of revisionist interpretations of history in the public sphere and in public memory, and the sum of those views amount to an alternate view of the history of the Japanese state, one that stands opposed to the official position as expressed in the Murayama Statement (cf. Saaler 2005: 72f).

Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo has come to occupy centre-stage in the politics of memory in Japan (Saaler 2003; Saaler 2005: ch. 2). Since its founding in the Meiji era, it is the site where those who gave up their lives in Japans civil and foreign wars have been remembered (cf. Breen 2007; Takahashi 2005). In the prewar and wartime period, it was a state institution, one of the major pillars of state Shinto. Today, it is seen as particularly problematic that the Shrine, in addition to honouring the "heroic souls" (eirei) of approximately 2.4 million war dead, accords god-like status to six military officers

and one civilian sentenced to death by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE, also known as the Tokyo Trials) as war criminals. The Shrine has also consecrated the souls of those accused by that Tribunal, who died during their trials as well as those serving sentences after being convicted for war crimes. The problem of the war criminals enshrined in Yasukuni is closely related to the view of history presented in the Shrines museum, the Yüshükan (iUgfctft). The goal of this museum is "to more correctly (yori tadashiku) [sic] impart the truth (shinjitsu) about modern Japanese history." (Yasukuni Jinja Shamusho 2002) The historical narrative one can read there corresponds in large measure to that propagated by historical revisionists. It portrays the history of modern Japan as a heroic fight of liberation of Asia from "the West." Each chapter of that history in the Yüshükan is shaped so as to fit into this mono-causal narrative, one that is notable for its continuity, treating even Japan's wars in China and other parts of Asia in the 1930s and 1940s as "wars of liberation." Since 1952 the Yasukuni Shrine has been an "independent religious corporation" (dokuritsu shükyö höjin) whose views about history are not directly connected to those of the state. However, visits by prominent politicians have served to make the shrine part of the state's public memory. Prime ministerial visits have come to be seen as being of particular symbolic significance. Calls at the Shrine by prime ministers, however, came to a halt in 1985 although Hashimoto Ryütaró, concurrently chairman of the Japan Association of Bereaved Families (Nihon Izokukai), made an appearance at Yasukuni in 1996 while prime minister. Koizumi Junichiro (2001-2006) revived prime ministerial visits and so doing made the Shrine once more part of the states politics of memory. His highly publicized appearances became the cause of an international outcry. Appearing at the Shrine, the head of the Japanese government performs the function of sanctioning the historical views expressed in the Yüshükan, the Shrine's museum in spite of the fact that the vision of the past presented in the Yüshükan is at odds with the governments official position as expressed in the Murayama Statement. However during his visits to Yasukuni, the Prime Minister did not explicitly distance himself from the revisionist views presented here, neither did he choose to pay exclusive visits to other memorials such as the Chidorigafuchi Senbotsusha Boen (officially designated as the "National Cemetary" in English).

Koizumi's choices, however, were somewhat limited in view of the fact that public memorial sites and commemorative ceremonies displaying a self-critical view of the past do not exist in large numbers in Japan. This is in spite of the existence of evidence that a self-critical vision of the past has widespread public support within broad segments of Japanese society as well as among the populations of Japan's neighbour countries, victims of past acts of Japanese aggression. A central site for the commemoration of Japanese war dead - to say nothing of Asian victims of Japanese aggression - has yet to be built,¹⁵¹ The absence of such a memorial has been the cause of considerable criticism within Japan itself (Arai 1994), especially in the early 1990s, during discussions of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war (Seraphim 1996 and 2006). Plans were made to create a central national memorial site, established by the Japanese state, but in the relevant committee, which met under the auspices of the Ministry of Health and

Welfare (kôseishô), deep divisions emerged among members as to how the memorial site should deal with war responsibility. The lack of consensus brought the project to a halt, and the funds allocated for the memorial site were used instead to build the Shôwa-kan (Shôwa Hall¹⁵²), a memorial museum close to the Yasukuni Shrine, which opened in 1999. Funded by the Japanese government, the Shôwa-kan is administered by the Japan Association of Bereaved Families. In addition, an "Exhibition Hall and Documentation Centre for Peace Prayers" (Heiwa Kinen Tenji Shiryôkan) was established in Shinjuku in 2000. These institutions, although strictly speaking not memorials, fail to embody a critical view of the wartime past. Far from devoting space to Japanese responsibility for war, both these institutions are examples of displays of Japanese victim consciousness. Neither domestically nor internationally are these institutions seen as alternative war memorial sites that offer a solution to the Yasukuni problem. Therefore, they cannot be considered to representing a consensus regarding the Japanese view of history, and it is not surprising that the number of visitors remains low.

Table 1: Number of Visitors to Japanese Memorial Sites and Museums related to the Asia-Pacific War

The problem of creating a generally acknowledged, central site to commemorate war victims therefore remains unresolved, and politicians have once again recently distanced themselves from a new effort at establishing one. In 2000 a "Working Group for Considering Memorial Sites and Other Facilities to Commemorate the War Dead and to Pray for Peace" (Tsuito, heiwa kinen no tame no kinenhi-to shisetsu no arikata okangaerukondankaiiif^ •

was organized in the office of the Chief Cabinet Secretary (naikaku kanbd-chokan) at the initiative of Prime Minister Koizumi. In December of that year, the working group issued a report supporting the need for a "new memorial site" (see Saaler 2003, chap. 3d; Shusho Kantei 2003), but there has been no follow-up. No meetings of the working wroup have been called since the issuing of the report. The character of the "new institution" (atarashii shisetsu) to commemorate the war dead the report describes, as critics have noted, would not have brought about a

decisive change in the Japanese politics of memory. In the eyes of its critics, the "new institution" as envisioned by the working group could be expected to offer little by way of an admission of Japanese responsibility for the war, but rather serve as a site for prayers of peace where all - undefined - victims of war could be commemorated. As the interim report noted, visitors would "not be subjected to a one-sided (ichigiteki) interpretation of history," and therefore, at a future "new institution", no commitment to Japanese war responsibility, as demanded both at home and abroad, would be made.

The Politics of Memory vs. Historical Consciousness

Public memory in Japanese memorials and museums thus tends to be influenced strongly by the revisionist historical narrative of the Tsukuru-kai and the movement of historical revisionism; its members have been involved in several of the aforementioned projects and memorials. Since the politics of memory of a state usually rests on a certain societal consensus, some observers have concluded that the revisionist historical narrative underlying the above-mentioned memorial sites also rests on a "formidable social base" in Japanese society (McCormack 2000: 65; cf. also Fujitani et al. 2001: 23; Oguma and Ueno 2003, chap. 1). The large press runs of publications by Tsukuru-kai members seem to support such conclusions as well. To confirm or disprove this assumption, it is necessary to access Japanese "historical consciousness," a topic that has attracted increased research interest in recent decades. In Germany, post-war interest in this topic is associated with the work of Karl-Ernst Jeismann and Jörn Rüsen, and was developed in conjunction with research on historical didactics. Researchers in other countries have also taken an interest in the topic. The Canadian "Centre for the Study of Historical Consciousness," founded in 2000, defines its subject as follows:

The study of historical consciousness is distinct from both historical research and historiographic research. The distinction can be seen in this way: when we study history [...], we are looking at the past. When we study historical consciousness, we are studying how people look at the past. [...] The study of historical consciousness differs, as well, from historiography, which examines only how historians look at the past. Historical consciousness can thus be defined as individual and collective understandings of the past, the cognitive and cultural factors which shape those understandings, as well as the relations of historical understandings to those of the present and the future. (CSHC 2002: Internet)

In his study "Japanese Views of the War" (Nihonjin no sensdkan; 1995), the Japanese historian Yoshida Yutaka studied historical consciousness in this sense, using public opinion polls and popular representations of history to examine how the Japanese viewed the wartime past of their country. Because there has been so much debate about this part of Japans past of late, there has also been a corresponding increase in surveys that we can regard as empirical studies of Japanese historical consciousness. One representative example, particularly helpful here, was a survey conducted in 2000 by the polling institute of the semi-public television station NHK (Makita 2000). Its general focus was on Japanese attitudes toward war and peace, with some of its questions making specific reference to Japans wartime past. The results were surprisingly

unambiguous, and permit the conclusion that there is hardly any basis in Japanese society for historical revisionist views. Only a small portion of respondents to the poll would deny the aggressive character of Japanese warfare in Asia, and the large majority agreed that successor generations had to continue to assume responsibility for the war.

Table 2: Opinion survey conducted by NHK in May 2000. Question no. 24a: "The last war¹⁵³ (saki no senso) was a war of aggression conducted by Japan against its Asian neighbours - what do you think about this statement?"

In answer to the question "Do you consider the 'Asia-Pacific War of 1931-45' a war of aggression against Japan's Asian neighbours or not?", 51% of the respondents said they thought it was. Only 15% subscribed to the claims made by historical revisionists denying the aggressive character of Japan's wars.

As for the question of continued responsibility, the NHK survey also asked: "Do you think the postwar generation should still bear responsibility for Japans actions during the last war?" The answers here divide the generations. Among 16-19 year olds, 69% answered in the affirmative; among those over 60, only 38% agreed. Given the

popularity among Japanese youth of certain revisionist authors, this result may seem particularly surprising. However, this author's surveys, conducted from 2002-4 among nearly 1,100 students attending three universities (two public, one private) in the Tokyo metropolitan area, confirm this finding (Saaler 2005: 143-46) as do the results of other surveys (see Yoshimi 1987: 276; Obinata et al. 1999: 100). Even taking a certain degree of error into account (answers given due to political correctness concerns, tatemae vs. honne, i.e. an open statement made to other people vs. one's real attitude), one would have to say that revisionist views fall on quite barren soil among Japanese youth.¹⁵⁴

Moreover, there is an astounding stability with regards to the results of such opinion polls. The percentage of respondents who did not regard the Asia-Pacific war as a war of aggression also stood at 15% in the early 1990s, according to surveys cited in Yoshida (1995), the same percentage as found in the NHK survey of 2000. More recent surveys conducted by the mass-circulation Japanese newspapers Yomiuri Shinbun in 2005 and Asahi Shinbun in 2006 yielded almost identical figures, although the difference in the questions asked elicited somewhat more nuanced responses. These polls further demonstrated that Japanese society on the whole does not consider Japan's efforts to come to terms with the past as sufficient. A clear majority of the respondents said that Japan should continue reflecting on its past and should not close its eyes to its past nor should discussions about war responsibility be ended.¹⁵⁵ Thus, in the population at large, historical revisionist views have not succeeded in making significant inroads with respect to historical consciousness, despite the high visibility of such views in the media since the late 1990s. Therefore, such apologetic visions of the past must be considered as belonging to a minority, one that, however, remains influential because of its prominence in the public sphere and its connections with the political arena.

Closing Considerations

It has become clear that the historical revisionism of the Tsukuru-kai has failed to undermine widely held views about Japan's wartime past. The consistency of opinion polls exploring the historical consciousness of the Japanese quoted above, the decreasing influence of the Tsu- kuru-kai in recent years, the shrinking of its membership and its split into two rival organizations in 2007 indicate that the historical revisionist movement has run out of steam. In the most recent round of textbook adoptions in 2009, revisionist textbooks were again rejected by all but a few municipalities. The revisionist textbooks garnered little more than 1% of the history textbook market, an almost negligible number. The historical views of the population at large obviously continue to be shaped by different factors, such as the views of academic historiography, which still, to a large degree, dominates the contents of history textbooks and history education in Japan, notwithstanding the tendency of the textbook approval system on the ministerial level to privilege textbooks with a conservative outlook and being tough on books that present a strongly critical view of Japan's wartime history, such as the famous textbook by the late Ienaga Saburo (1913-2002). Ienaga's history textbook for high schools was rejected by the ministry approval officers in the 1960s, inspiring Ienaga to initate a series of lawsuits against the Japanese state, which, in his opinion, had denied him his right to freedom of expression, causing him to suffer from psychological stress.

However, historical views of larger parts of the population are also strongly influenced by more mundane factors, such as popular literature, a prominent example of which would be the hugely popular writings of Shiba Ryotaro (1923-96), whose works can also be seen as a bulwark against the spread of recent historical revisionism. His "historical novels" (rekishi shosetsu) continue to be highly popular, most particularly among Japanese youth, and his "works of historical fiction and criticism have had unparalleled influence on the historical consciousness of the Japanese people" (Nakamura 1998: 26; cf. also Kang 2003: 109; Narita 2003).¹⁵⁶ Shiba certainly does not provide a properly critical view of history; his novels are suffused instead by a dichotomy between the "bright Meiji Era" (akarui Meiji: 1868-1912) and the "dark Showa period" (kurai Shdwa: 1926-45) - a time of militarism and wars of aggression. But in the context of his essayistic writings on history, particularly in his six-volume collection "The Shape of this Country" (Kono kuni no katachi), published in 1997, he unequivocally calls the wars of the 1930s irresponsible wars of aggression, and the "Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" (Daitd-A kyoeiken) a mere glorification (bika) of Japanese expansionism. Shiba's continuing popularity doubtlessly contributes to the difficulty historical revisionism has in gaining a foothold. It is, therefore, not surprising that leading Tsukuru-kai members have harshly attacked Shiba as a traitor to the nation - a move hardly helpful in reviving the Tsukuru-kai's fortunes. Moreover, Japan's deep-rooted pacifism is also a factor making it difficult for affirmative interpretations of past wars (not to speak of current and future wars) to gain acceptance.¹⁵⁷

To be sure, simply on the basis of political and financial support and the interconnections with the political establishment it enjoys, the historical revisionist movement certainly has the potential to continue to provoke public debate and trigger international

controversies. To counteract its arguments, Japanese historians would need to emerge from their (self-imposed) narrow national perspective that continues to dominate the guild, engage in critical self-reflection and develop new perspectives that would make the neo-national, or neo-nationalist, arguments of historical revisionists obsolete. In doing so, the view of history that Shiba provides, whose popularity rests not least on the longing for "bright stories" from the history of the nation, would need to be critically, but openly examined. In doing so, the astonishing popularity of some of Shiba's novels in Korea could be a starting point for asking whether (or how) a synthesis of Shiba's nationally-motivated and nationally-inspired, but in the end also deeply individualistic perspectives could be integrated with postnational or transnational approaches to history.

148 Though the historical revisionist project aims to rewrite the entire history of the nation, the heart of the revisionist narrative is the re-interpretation of the Asia-Pacific war. For this reason, as well as due to the political implications of such a re-interpretation, it is also at the centre of the following considerations.

149 "During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations." http://www.kantei. go.jp/foreign/aniv.html; see also Saaler 2005, chap. 1.5.1.

150 The remark by LDP politician Aso Taro in 2003 that Koreans "voluntarily adopted Japanese names during Japans colonial rule and were not forced to do so" (see Asia Times 6 June 2003, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/EF06Dh04.html) is a case in point. Aso became Prime Minister in 2007.

151 The government-sponsored "Memorial Ceremony for the War Dead" (Zenkoku Senbotsusha Tsuitd-shiki) is held annually in the multi-purpose hall "Nippon Budokan" in Kitanomaru Park in Tokyo, in close vicinity of the Yasukuni Shrine. It was introduced in 1963 according to a cabinet decision (http://www.ndl.go.jp/horei_jp/kakugi/txt/txt01421.htm).

152 Official name in English is "National Showa Memorial Museum" (see www.showakan.go.jp).

153 Defined as the war starting in 1931 with the Manchurian Incident, then escalating into the Sino-Japanese War of 1937 and the Pacific War in 1941 and ending in Japan's surrender in 1945.

154 Of course, more detailed investigations would lead to the conclusion that specific arguments made by revisionists would find widespread acceptance by a majority of Japanese youth. But the heart of recent historical revisionism, namely the positive interpretation of the war and of Japans colonial past, is certainly not shared by the majority.

155 Interestingly, in Germany, the percentage of those responding that "the history of Nazism has been discussed sufficiently, that it is time to end discussions about Germany's war legacy and put the past behind us" (the so-called Schlussstrichdebatte) is higher than corresponding claims concerning Japanese history in Japan. In Japanese polls in 2005 and 2006, those who stated that they think Japan has done "enough" (jûbun) to come to terms with its past were clearly a minority with a number below 20%. However, 69% of the respondents confirmed that Japans efforts are still "insufficient" (see, for example, Kimura 2006: 190). In Germany, however, the so-called Schlussstrichdebatte found 58% support in opinion polls in 1999 and 43% in 2000 (Burklin und Jung 2003).

156 Shiba's most popular and longest-selling book, "Ryoma On The Move" (Rydma ga yuku), dates from the 1960s, and has by now sold more than 20 million copies. It has been repeatedly and regularly reworked not just in feature films and television series but also in CD-ROM form (see Saaler 2005: chapter 3.2.2; Narita 2003). At the time of writing this article (December 2009/January 2010), TV dramas based on Shiba's works (Saka no ue no kumo, "Clouds above the Hill", a novel dealing with the Japanese victory in the 1904/05 Russo-Japanese War) or following a similar pattern (Rydma-den, "Ryoma's life," both broadcasted in NHK) reconfirm this assumption. On the popularity of Shiba see also Hirano, Saaler and Sabel 2008.

157 Thus, on the cover of Kobayashi Yoshinori's best-selling manga Sensdron ("On War"), one reads the suggestive question: "Are you going to war? Or are you going to give up being Japanese?" (Senso ni ikimasu ka? Soretomo Nihonjin oyamemasu ka?). (see also the October 2004 edition of the magazine Sapio).

Referencesy

Arai Shin'ichi: 'Senbotsusha tsuito heiwa kinen-kan' o tou. In: Arai, Shin'ichi (ed.), Sensö Hakubutsukan, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1994 (Iwanami Bukkuletto 328), 2-27.

Assmann, Aleida: Erinnerungsräume. Formen und Wandlungen des Kulturellen Gedächtnisses, München: C.H. Beck, 1999.

AsiaSource: Japanese History Textbook Raises Concerns, Internet: http://www.asia-source.org/news/at_mp_02.cfm?newsid=48253 (posted 2003), accessible at http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/55a/456.html (last accessed in March 2010).

Breen, John: A Yasukuni Genealogy. In Breen, John (ed.): Yasukuni, the War Dead and the Struggle for Japans Past. London: Hurst & Co., 2007.

Bürklin, Wilhelm und Christian Jung: Deutschland im Wandel, Internet: http:// www.bankenverband.de/pic/artikelpic/082003/br0308_wg_D-im-Wandel.pdf (2003).

CSHC (Centre for the Study of Historical Consciousness): Definition of Historical Consciousness, Internet: http://www.cshc.ubc.ca/about.php, 2002.

Foljanty-Jost, Gesine: Schulbuchgestaltung als Systemstabilisierung in Japan. Bochum: Studienverlag Brockmeyer, 1979.

Fujitani, Takashi et al: Introduction. In: Takashi Fujitani et al. (eds.): Perilous Memories: the Asia-Pacific War(s), Durham: Duke University Press, 2001 1-29.

Hirano Tatsushi, Sven Saaler und Stefan Säbel: Recent Developments in the Representation of National Memory and Local Identities: The Politics of Memory in Tsushima, Matsuyama, and Maizuru. In: Elis, Volker and Lützeler, Ralph (eds): Japanstudien 20: Regionalentwicklung und regionale Disparitäten, (2008), pp. 247-77. Online accessible at http://www.dijtokyo.org/articles/JS20_Hirano-Saaler-Saebel.pdf.

Kang Sang-jung: Han-nashonarizumu, Tokyo: Kyöiku Shiryö Shuppankai, 2003.

Kimura Shöichi: Tokyo saiban 60nen, sensö sekinin no kühaku to 'mizukara' no fuzai. In: Asahi Söken Repöto no. 1983 (6.2006), 2-13 (analysis) and 184-203 (statistics).

McCormack, Gavan: The Japanese Movement to 'Correct' History. In: Laura Hein and Mark Seiden (eds.): Censoring History. Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany and the United States. Armonk and London: M. E. Sharpe, 2000, 53-73.

Makita Tetsuo: Nihonjin no sensô to heiwa-kan. Sono jizoku to fûka. In: NHK Hôsô Kenkyû to Chôsa 2000, 2-19.

Nakamura Masanori: The History Textbook Controversy and Nationalism. In: Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 30:2 (1997): 24-29.

Narita Ryûichi: Shiba Ryôtarô no Bakumatsu - Meiji: 'Ryômaga Yuku' to 'Saka no ue no Kumo' o Yomu, Tôkyô: Asahi Shinbunsha (Asahi Sensho 728), 2003.

Nora, Pierre: Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire. In : Representations 26 (1989): 7-25.

Nora, Pierre: The Reasons for the Current Upsurge in Memory. In: Transit. Europäische Revue 22 (2002): 18-31.

Obinata Toshio et al.: Kimitachi wa Sensô de Shineru ka: Kobayashi Yoshinori 'Ssensô-ron' Hihan, Tôkyô: Ôtsuki Shoten, 1999.

Oguma Eiji and Ueno Yôko: 'Iyashi' no Nashonarizumu. Kusa no ne Hoshu Undo no Jisshô Kenkyû, Tôkyô: Keiô Gijuku Daigaku Shuppankai, 2003.

Rekishi Kentô Iinkai [History Examination Committee] (ed.): Daitôa Sensô no Sôkatsu [Summary of the Greater East Asian War], Tôkyô: Tentensha, 1995.

Richter, Steffi: Nicht nur ein Sturm im Wasserglas: Japans jüngster Schulbuchstreit. In: Internationale Schulbuchforschung 23 (1999): 277-300.

Richter, Steffi: Zurichtung von Vergangenheit als Schmerzlinderung in der Gegenwart. In: Steffi Richter und Wolfgang Höpken (eds.): Vergangenheit im Gesellschaftskonflikt. Ein Historikerstreit in Japan, Köln, Weimar, Wien: Böhlau, 2003, 1-26.

Richter, Steffi (ed.): Contested Views of a Common Past. Revisions of History in Contemporary East Asia. Frankfurt and New York: Campus, 2008.

Saaler, Sven: Ein Ersatz für den Yasukuni-Schrein? Die Diskussion um eine neue Gedenkstätte für Japans Kriegsopfer. In: Nachrichten der Gesellschaft für Natur-und Völkerkunde Ostasiens e.V. 173-174 (2003): 59-91.

Saaler, Sven: Politics, Memory and Public Opinion. The History Textbook Controversy and Japanese Society, München: Iudicium (= Monographien aus dem Deutschen Institut für Japanstudien, Bd. 39), 2005.

Seaton, Philip A.: Japans Contested War Memories: The 'Memory Rifts' in Historical Consciousness of World War II. London: Routledge, 2007.

Seraphim, Franziska: Der Zweite Weltkrieg im öffentlichen Gedächtnis Japans: Die Debatte zum fünfzigsten Jahrestag der Kapitulation. In: Hijiya-Kirschnereit, Irmela (ed.): Überwindung der Moderne? Japan am Ende des Zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1996, 25-56.

Seraphim, Franziska: War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945-2005. Cambridge (Mass.) and London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2006.

Shiba Ryôtarô: Kono Kuni no Katachi 4, Tôkyô: Bungei Shunjü (Bungei Bunko Shi-1-64), 1997.

Shushö Kantei, Hökokusho, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/tuitou/ kettei/021224houkoku.html, 2003.

Takahashi Tetsuya: Yasukuni Mondai. Tôkyô: Chikuma Shobô, 2005 (Chikuma Shin-sho 532).

Wakamiya Yoshibumi: Sengo Hoshu no Ajia-kan, Tôkyô: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1995.

Yamazaki, Jane W.: Japanese Apologies for World War II: A Rhetorical Study. London: Routledge, 2005

Yaskukuni Jinja Shamusho: Yasukuni Dai-hyakka, Tokyo: Yasukuni Jinja Shamusho, 2002.

Yoshida Yutaka: Nihonjin no Sensokan, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995. Yoshimi Yoshiaki: Kusa no ne no Fashizumu, Tokyo: The University of Tokyo Press, 1987.